Regionalism, multi-tier governance and conflict resolution by Michael Emerson







Received in July 2003
The stabilisation through regional and multilateral cooperation within the framework
of the European Union is the topic today. These terms are all part of standard political
discourse in South East Europe, often accompanied by description of abundant initiatives
by various regional or multilateral organisations. What is more often lacking is an explicit
idea about how these institutional initiatives are supposed to achieve the objective of
stabilisation after a prior period or even long history of regional conflict. The present paper
addresses this question, drawing attention to some unconventional developments in multi-
tier government structures relevantfor post-conflict situations. It also explores a new
European regional concept, that of the Wider Europe, which is now much discussed
by the EU and its neighbours.
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1. Introduction
This is a template case of a dynamic model
moving through five stages. It moves from an initial
peaceful equilibrium that is only sustained however
by authoritarian rule, through an episode of seces-
sionist violence on to a second equilibrium of fro-
zen conflict. Later it may possibly be shifted with
the aid strong external intervention into a settlement,
and on under certain conditions then move towards
transformation of the prior conflict structures into a
new democratic equilibrium state of conflict resolu-
tion.
Stage i: Authoritarian equilibrium, with
latent conflict. An ethnically complex state lives in
a state of peace under authoritarian or imperial rule,
which means that the communities have at best a
weak culture of democracy and civil society. The
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tensions between the different ethnic communities
are serious, reflecting memories of past conflicts. The
authoritarian or imperial leadership may have cre-
ated or exacerbated the tensions with divide and rule
politics.
Stage ii: Regime collapses and conflict
erupts. With the end of authoritarian rule, due to
some kind of regime collapse and/or self-determina-
tion struggles, the latent conflict erupts in the name
of a secessionist cause. Blood is shed, and people
become displaced. Territory is won by a secession-
ist entity, accompanied by ethnic cleansing. The se-
cessionist entity remains unrecognised by an inter-
national community that fears an anarchical and vio-
lent multiplication of ethnic microstates.
Stage iii: The conflict is frozen in a newly
entrenched equilibrium. The conflict parties are
unable to negotiate a peaceful settlement and recon-
ciliation. The conflict is said to become frozen, as
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the new status quo continues for years. But the new
status quo is not static at all, as political and eco-
nomic interests adapt to the new situation. Proper-
ties have new occupiers and de facto owners. New
political parties or ruling groups take over, strongly
based on ethnic nationalist discourse. The ruling
groups are undemocratic and corrupt, profiting from
the business or real estate properties expropriated in
the war, and from opportunities for smuggling.
More than one external power may be inter-
ested in the conflict, and back opposite sides, since
the conflict arises on a geo-politieal fault line as well
as a local one. This weakens the incentive for the
local parties to negotiate a compromise, since hard-
line positions arc protected by an external power. If
the external powers are unable or unwilling to or-
ganise a powerful impetus to change the status quo
(either through coordination or one party becoming
dominant); the de facto secession deepens, and the
opposing parties gravitate into the economic, secu-
rity and political sphere of their protecting power.
This becomes the new equilibrium that goes on in-
definitely into the future.
Stage iv: External powers intervene to me-
diate 0'- impose a settlement. In an alternative case
the external powers) intervene - with heavy media-
tion or even forcefully - to impose an alternative so-
lution to secession. This takes the shape of a new
constitution with some form of multi-tier governance
and/or power sharing arrangement between the eth-
nic communities, with guarantees supplied by the
external power(s), and various arrangements for refu-
gees and rehabilitation.
Stage v: Conflict transformation and reso-
lution, leading to a new democratic equilibrium.
For the settlement to become sustainable under con-
ditions of democracy two conditions have to be sat-
isfied: (I) it has provide for the basic needs of the
populations and establish common ground rules for
the legitimate rights of individuals and their com-
munities, and (2) the sources of the conflict have to
be further abated and transformed, with the new po-
litical structures providing a fresh set of incentives
and expectations, leading to a reconstruction of the
actual and perceived interests of the parties. The proc-
ess of Europeanisation can provide for this, as long
as the perspectives of European integration for the
former conflict parties arc sufficiently credible and
front loaded with real advantages.
One can say that the conflicts of the former
Soviet Union (South Caucasus and Moldova) are still
stuck at Stage iii, with the frozen situation of recent
years having led to a deepening entrenchment of the
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secessionist status quo, to which the role of the ex-
ternal powers has itself contributed in a negative
manner.
On the other hand the conflicts of the former
Yugoslavia saw external intervention that was early
enough to prevent entrenchment of new status quo
situations, thus skipping Stage iii, and passing di-
rectly on from Stage iv to Stage v. (The Western in-
tervention was not early enough over Bosnia, but at
least the comparison with the Caucasus stands).
2. Typology and mechanics
of mufti-tier qovernance '
Standard political discourse in South East
Europe over the past decade has much discussed the
relative merits of local versus continental regional-
ism. The EU itself has tended to favour local regional
cooperation as a prerequisite of integration with the
EU. But this was for a time caricatured in the region
as the choice between a neo-- Yugoslavia versus Eu-
rope, with no votes for the former. In the last few
years this dialectic has moved on to something closer
to a synthesis, admitting that both regional and con-
tinental integration have to develop progressively in
paralIc\.
However, while this general idea of a three-
tier structure - the state, the region and Europe - has
become commonly accepted, there is still much 'devil
in the detail'. The array of possible institutional struc-
tures for the post-conflict regime is much more com-
plex, as suggested in the typologies of Tables I and
2. In fact a four-tier structure is often apparent for a
region such as South East Europe, with the states
themselves also often needing federative structures.
as in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia,
and maybe Kosovo at some point. (Bosnia is itself
has a three tier structure with the Bosniac-Croat fed-
eration within the state structure, so here even a five
tier structure may be discerned, adding South East
Europe as the region and the EU. This sounds too
much for efficient governance.)
The recognition of secession and indcpend-
ence is only parsimoniously granted by the interna-
tional community, out of fear of continuous fragmen-
tation into microstates, coupled to ethnic cleansing.
Yet the wider South East Europe has several seces-
sionist entities sti II in legal limbo - Ko sovo.
Transniestria, orthern Cyprus, Abkhazia, and
agorno Karabak, with Montenegro in suspense. If
workable federal olutions cannot be reached there
arc two unconventional alternatives, both of which
rely on the strength of the external powers as fourth
tier.
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Table 1. Typology of solutions to ethno-secessionist
One tier - Secession and/or unitary states)
I. Secession denied, unitary state prevails
2. Secession and independence, recognised internationally
3. De facto secession and independence, non-recognised
Two tier - with federative solutions
4. Federation (one state in international law, decentralised powers)
5. Confederation (two states international law, some common policies)
6. Common state (one state in international law, some common policies)
Three tier - with regional cooperation
7. Regional community of two or more states and sub-state entities)
Four tier - with role of supranational or external powers
8. Multilateral & Wider Europe, e.g. OSCE/UN/Council of Europe
9. 'Europeanisation' 'Russification '/ 'Pax Americana' (for overarching protection/association/inte-
gration/annexation)
10. Coalition/consortium/condominium, e.g. EU and US, or troika ofEU-RUS-US
variants, some more democratic than others (see Ta-
ble 2 on protectorates, association, integration and
annexation). One could imagine that Kosovo or
Northern Cyprus, in the event of continuing dead-
lock over their final status, might become candidates
for a new model solution, consisting of a legally or-
dered association with the European Union without
full statehood. In this context one could also envis-
age for Kosovo that it would become a full partner
in regional cooperative structures alongside the in-
ternationally recognised sovereign states.
On the other hand one may observe in
Abkhazia the model of creeping unofficial integra-
tion/annexation, as the population of this region ac-
quire Russian citizenship, use the Russian rouble,
and enjoy the protection of the Russian army. An-
nexation has also been talked of at various stages by
Turkish politicians with regard to Northern Cyprus,
but this language is dropped in the present context
of Turkey seeking an opening of negotiations for
accession.
The first of these is the 'common state' solu-
tion, which may be defined as a thin federative struc-
ture, more like a confederation functionally, but with
single legal personality internationally for the com-
mon state. The advantage of this formula is that it
avoids secession, while the state level of governance
may be light enough to be acceptable to parties that
may have recently been in conflict together. The
weakness of this structure is that centrifugal forces
may easily prevail, unless the common state is held
together by the overarching power of the fourth tier,
be it the EU and/or the international community.
Serbia and Montenegro come closest to this formula.
The Annan plan for Cyprus would have been another
example, modelled in fact on the case of Belgium
which has become a thin dyadic federation held to-
gether by the importance of the European Union tier.
The second alternative might be that of a semi-
recognised sub-state entity, which is integrated with
an external power, thus seeing a combination of the
tier one and tier four. This formula can have several
Table 2: On Protectorates, association, integration and annexation
o Protectorate. An external power keeps the peace' the aid of military or police forces as necessary,
and may also exercise powers of civil administration. The external power may be invited or unin-
vited, which means different degrees of democratic legitimacy.
o Association. A self-governing entity opts some or even many of the policies and laws of an exter-
nal power, us y its much bigger neighbour, but without becoming part of the political structure of the
neighbour. This regime derives its legitimacy from being voluntarily sought or accepted.
o Integration. The entity voluntarily becomes a full part of the economic and political structures and
jurisdiction of the (formerly' external ') power.
o Annexation. When this integration happens through the use or threat of force, or without the
consent of the parties directly concerned, or the legitimising agreement 0 the international commu-
nity.
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and-spoke bilateralism towards Ukraine and
Moldova. The Wider Europe initiative risks being a
flop unless it is given more Wider European policy
content and a credible institutional backup. But a flop
would be more than a non-event, for two reasons.
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The EU and international community will typi-
cally support the idea that conflictual regions should
not only settle their differences with federative struc-
tures, but also set up structures to organise regional
cooperation. Natural geographic regions such as the
Caucasus and Balkans (or Baltic Sea, Black Sea etc.)
always have a potentially useful agenda for coop-
eration over such matters as transport, energy and
communications networks, policies for regional free
trade and movement of persons, environmental prob-
lems, combating cross-border crime etc. While the
idea that regional cooperation can create sufficient
common interests to displace or overcome prior con-
flict structures proved valid for Western Europe af-
ter the second world war, it is surely not so for a
much smaller and poorer region such as the Balkans
or Caucasus, where the incentives for regional co-
operation are not in themselves strong enough to tip
the balance decisively from 'war to peace'.
The supranational or external powers may
overarch both these common state and regional co-
operation arrangements, in order to ensure their sur-
vival in a post-conflict enviromnent among the weak
or failed states. Here the potential role of the EU has
unique advantages. When the conflict states or enti-
ties have a long-term perspective of full EU mem-
bership the democratic legitimacy of the overarching
power can be justified. The task for the EU could be
therefore to work on staged processes, in which some
former conflict zones might first achieve EU associ-
ate status, and move on later maybe to accession can-
didate status.
3. Enter the Wider Europe
However this fourth tier now acquires in Eu-
rope a new dimension. As the ink has been drying
this year on the 12 new Treaties of Accession to the
European Union, the term 'Wider Europe' has swiftly
entered into the discourse of European foreign min-
istcrs and the European institutions (with 'New
Neighbours' and 'Proximity Policy' being used as
alternative terms). No coincidence of course. The
topic is of strategic importance for the European
Union, and also for Russia as the major non-EU ac-
tor on the European stage. The subject has been
opened up by two documents from the European
Commission", complemented by Solana's security
strategy documents (preliminary version of June),
final version forthcoming in December). The Euro-
pcan Parliament now finalises its report on the same
subject".
But the content so far on offer from the EU is
very thin, and focuses mostly on a little more hub-
First, it would risk boosting some worrying
dynamics in the new Europe, namely the increasing
polarisation between the two bilateral hub-and-spoke
systems of the EU and Russia, as opposed to deep-
ening the common European policy space. This
would mean and increasingly tense EU-Russian re-
lationship with respect to their interests in their over-
lapping near abroad.
Symptomatic of these tensions arc the contra-
dictions between the EU-Russian endeavours to ere-
ate a Common European Economic Space and the
recent announcement by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan
and Ukraine to form a Single Economic Space, while
Ukraine seeks for the EU a signal over a perspective
for ultimate EU membership.
Another example is seen in Moldova, where
there is new EU interest in helping find a solution to
the Transniestria problem. Moldova wants to join
the South East European integration train, but Rus-
sia so far resists the EU coming seriously into the
Transniestria affair.
Both these examples, from trade policy to con-
flict resolution, cry out for cooperative European
solutions, involving the EU, Russia and states that
lie between them.
Second, it would mean failing realise the EU's
unique potential for aiding the process of conflict
resolution in the European South Eastern periphery,
from Balkans to the Caucasus. The EU's unique tool
is the modern process of 'Europcanisation ' beyond
the states which are negotiating accession. The force
of the incentives coming from the EU to transform
the former communist and fascist states of Europe
in terms of common European values and standards
is today ineffective beyond the accession process.
The Wider Europe should be precisely about extend-
ing effective Europeanisation beyond the accession
process, rather than a symbolic diplomatic gesture
to the excluded.
How give substance to the Wider Europe slo-
gan? The answer has to lie in (a) the definition of
the territories to be covered, (b) identification of the
policy areas of common European interest, and (c)
the institutional shape of their multilateral organisa-
tion (in addition to their inevitable bilateral content)
We now set out a thought experiment, supposing that
the EU wished to make of the Wider Europe an im-
portant part of the new European architecture.
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On the geographic extent of the Wider Europe
the obvious candidate is the membership map of the
Council of Europe, since this covers all of what is
uncontroversially 'Europe', all of these states hav-
ing subscribed to common fundamental political val-
ues and norms". This would correct for the Commis-
sion document's much criticised exclusion of the
South Caucasus states from the Wider Europe.
On the common European policy 'areas' or
'spaces', actually the last EU-Russian summits in
May 2003 agreed to a list of no less than five of
them, to which two more need to be added to be sys-
temically complete. The seven common European
policy areas may be conventionally grouped under
three broad dimensions - political, economic and
security - but to be tractable operationally the break-
down into the seven areas is needed, (see Box 1).
An overarching structure could start with an
upgrading of the so-called European Conference (the
periodic meetings between the EU and most other
European states), which should be more meaning-
fully renamed as the Pan-European (or Common
European) Conference. This forum should be opened
to all Council of Europe member states. However
core structures are required if this is not to resemble
the UN General Assembly without the UN Security
Council. Moreover the Council of Europe and OSCE
themselves also need core structures if they are to be
more relevant for a Europe with an EU of 25 and
more member states.
The Pan-European Conference would have a
Coordinating Group consisting of the EU (future
foreign minister), Russia and two rotating places for
non-EU member states. The Coordinating Group
would prepare meetings of the full conference, but
not have decision-making powers. In this respect
there would not be the jump to a full analogue with
the UN Security Council, although Russia has pushed
for something like this in relation to the OSCE.
The Pan-European Coordinating Group would
also supervise the work of separate coordinating
groups for each of the seven common policy spaces,
which would be structured in the same way with EU
and Russia as permanent members and two rotating
places. But to each of these sectoral coordinating
groups would be added the relevant specialised in-
stitutions:
• the Council of Europe for the two areas of the po-
litical and human dimension";
• the EEA/EFTA Surveillance Authority and DECD
for the trade and market area;
• the European Central bank for the monetary area;
Box 1: The seven Common European
Policy Areas"
Political and human dimension
1. Democracy and human rights area
2. Education, culture and research area
Economic dimension
3. Trade and market area
4. Monetary area
5. Infrastructure and network area
Security dimension
6. Area of justice internal security
7. Area of external security
• the Pan-European Conference of Transport Minis-
ters, the Energy Charter, the EIB and EBRD for the
infrastructure and network area;
• Europol for the justice and internal security area;
• NATO and the OSCE for the external security area.
These coordinating groups would facilitate the
exchanges between the Pan-European Conference
and the sectoral organisations, and so help give co-
herence, synergies and impetus to the overall Wider
Europe initiative. The EU institutions might take the
initiative in submitting Green Papers on the each of
the policy domains, to be followed no doubt by pro-
posals from Russia and other states of the Wider
Europe.
A final dimension to the Wider Europe is that
of defining its functional sub-regions. The Baltic,
Balkan and Mediterranean regions now have ad-
equate structures for advancing cooperation. The
Black Sea region is not yet however working as well
as it might, in spite of the comprehensive structure
of institutions established around the BSEC organi-
sation. However this regional sea and river basin
could become part of a Wider South East Europe
regional project. Today there are not even ferryboat
services going around the Black Sea. For tomorrow,
however, one can think about realising the huge eco-
nomic potential of the waterway system that sees the
Danube, Dniester, Dniepr, Don and Volga rivers all
converging on the Black Sea. With half of the Black
Sea coast accounted for by EU accession candidates,
the prospect of a new arms or hub of economic
growth in this region is highly inviting.
4. Concluding remarks
The conclusion that emerges from the above
is that the constitutional/institutional toolkit and ar-
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chitecture of 21st century Europe is still unsettled.
With the EU's present huge enlargement likely to
need many years to be digested, the conditions for
accession arc likely to get tougher. But the demands
for inclusion will also become greater, as long as the
EU system does not collapse or become paralysed.
This means that new models of association with the
EU are likely to emerge, especially for the still not
stabilised areas of recent conflict, and continuing
innovation in European multi-tier governance sys-
tems. The idea of a Wider Europe now gathers
strength, even if it is not yet well specified. The ob-
jective of this Wider Europe project is surely the 'so-




1 This section draws on an ongoing project of CEPS and Brus-
sels University (V11B) analysing comparatively four secession-
ist crises or conflicts of the South Eastern Europe (Serbia-
Montenegro, Moldova- Transniestria, Cyprus and Georgia-
Abkhazia). See B. Coppieters, M. Emerson et ai, "European In-
stitutional Models as Instruments of Conflict Resolution in the
Divided States of the European periphery ", CEPS Working Pa-
per No 195, July 2003.
2 European Commission, "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood.' A
New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern
Neighbours", COM(2003)104 final, 11.3.2003; "Paving the way
for a new neighbourhood Instrument ", COM(2003)393 final, I
July 2003.
3 Securing Europe in a Better World, document submitted by J.
Solana to the European Council, Thessaloniki, 19-21 June 2003.
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i.e. eliminating security threats or inclinations to-
wards conflict. It should thus both delimit Europe's
definitive frontiers, and the definitive transforma-
tion of former conflict situations within these fron-
tiers. South East Europe may regard itself as a spe-
cial region, with the EU's clear commitment to the
ultimate accession perspectives of the whole of it.
However the frontiers of this region are not that clear.
with Moldova coming at the eastern end, and then
Ukraine also likely to be given increasing attention
as a new neighbour. The idea of a Wider South East
Europe extending into the Black Sea, and up into the
major river basins that flow into it, seems likely to
rise on the agenda.
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4 European Parliament, draft report of the Committee on For-
eign Affairs (rapporteur: Pasqualina Napolitano), "Wider Europe
- Neighbourhood: A New Framework for relations with our east-
ern and Southem Neighbours ", 2003/2018(INI), October 2003.
5 Only Belarus is temporarily outside.
6 All these spaces are advocated by the EU and Russia at sum-
mit level together, except the Democracy and Human Rights
Area (presumably because of the shadow of Chechnya for Rus-
sia), and a Monetary Area (presumably because of institutional
complications on the EU side).
7 'The EU already bas regular Quadripartite meetings with the
Council of Europe (EU Council and Commission, Council of
Europe Chairman in Office and Secretary General), and this has
become a useful development.
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